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Do the SEC Whistleblower Provisions of Dodd Frank  
Deter Aggressive Financial Reporting?  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The stated goal of the 2011 SEC Whistleblower (WB) Program introduced as part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was to strengthen investor protection through greater deterrence of securities 
law violations and more effective regulatory enforcement. While the SEC has articulated the 
success of the program for detecting and prosecuting violations, there is no evidence on the 
effect of the program in deterring violations. In this paper, we consider the deterrent effect by 
examining the impact of the Program on aggressive financial reporting by U.S. firms. Despite 
ongoing challenges, including the high number of tips received and efforts by some managers to 
circumvent the new rules by muzzling whistleblowers, we document a significant reduction in 
abnormal accruals following the introduction of the regulation. In a difference-in-differences 
design, we also find that reductions in aggressive reporting are significantly greater for U.S. 
firms than for Canadian firms. Using a sample of firms with ratings of internal reporting program 
quality just prior to the introduction of WB Program, we find that reductions in aggressive 
reporting are greater for firms with weaker internal programs. We also find that the reporting of 
internal control weaknesses decreased significantly in the years following the introduction of the 
Program. Collectively, these findings provide important evidence of significant benefits of the 
SEC WB Program of Dodd-Frank Act for deterring financial reporting fraud. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In November 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a 
Whistleblower Program (WB Program) as part of the Dodd-Frank Act. The stated goal of the 
Program was to strengthen investor protection through greater deterrence of securities law 
violations and more effective and efficient regulatory enforcement on the part of the SEC. The 
Program was enacted in August 2011 and offers financial incentives to individuals reporting 
violations to the SEC.  Eligible whistleblowers can receive awards ranging from 10% to 30% of 
monetary sanctions for voluntarily providing original information about a violation that leads to 
the successful enforcement of a covered action.  
According to the SEC the WB Program has been a success. Former SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White called the program a “game changer”, and in a speech the former SEC Director of 
Enforcement Andrew J. Ceresney discussed, “…the transformative impact that the program has 
had on the Agency, both in terms of the detection of illegal conduct and in moving our 
investigations forward quicker and through the use of fewer resources.” 1. In its 2016 Annual 
Report, the SEC announced that the Office of the Whistleblower had awarded over $111 million 
to 34 whistleblowers in cases with more than $580 million ordered in sanctions. Ceresney noted 
that the WB Program has been particularly helpful in three categories: corporate disclosures and 
financials (financial reporting fraud); Ponzi schemes and offering frauds; and, violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Financial reporting fraud made up 22 percent of the tips received 
in 2016. 
While the SEC has articulated the effect of the program on its enforcement efforts, there is no 
evidence on the effect of the program in deterring securities law violations. In particular, it is not 
                                                
1 A. Ceresney, Speech, “The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: The Successful Early Years”, September 14, 2016. 
Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-sec-whistleblower-program.html. 
2 Major provisions of Dodd-Frank that impact the financial sector include: the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which 
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clear whether the WB Program has reduced aggressive financial reporting, and if it has, for what 
companies. Baloria, Marquardt and Wiedman (2017) (hereafter BMW 2017) provide early 
evidence of the perceived effectiveness of the WB Program by examining investors’ responses to 
events leading up to the enactment of the proposed regulations. They find that investors expected 
the new provisions to provide net benefits to investors as reflected in stock price returns, 
particularly for firms with weaker existing internal compliance and reporting programs. In this 
paper, we focus directly on the changes to aggressive financial reporting and internal controls 
around the introduction of the WB Program.  
While much of the previous literature uses restatements to measure aggressive reporting, 
doing so is problematic in this context. If the SEC whistleblower rules are effective in detecting 
fraud, the likelihood of a company restating its financial statements as a result of an investigation 
should increase following the introduction of the new rules. If the rules promote greater 
deterrence of fraud, the number of restatements should decrease (BMW 2017). Therefore, the 
impact of the new regulations on restatements is ambiguous. Instead, similar to the Cohen, Dey 
and Lys (2008) examination of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), we use measures of abnormal 
accruals to capture changes in aggressive reporting. For the sample period 2006 to 2014, we find 
that abnormal accruals are significantly lower in the years following the introduction of the SEC 
WB Program than the years prior. Controlling for factors identified in prior research as affecting 
the measurement of accruals, we document an overall reduction in accruals of approximately 11 
percent. This reduction is observed for both positive and negative accruals, with a reduction of 9 
percent and 17 percent in positive and negative accruals, respectively. We also observe a 
significant reduction in an ex ante measure for the probability of fraud following Beneish, Lee 
and Nichols (2013). 
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One challenge of this kind of research is attributing changes in reporting over the sample 
period to the introduction of the WB program and not other simultaneous changes. To address 
this issue we first eliminate all financial sector firms from our sample, as traditional measures of 
accruals are not meaningful for these firms, and because banks were simultaneously impacted by 
a number of provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.2 Second, we compare changes in reporting for 
our general population of firms to firms in the health care sector. As health care companies were 
already subject to similar whistleblower provisions under the False Claims Act (FCA), they are 
less likely to be affected by the introduction of the SEC program. Consistent with our 
expectations, accruals do not decline significantly for these firms. Third, we employ a difference-
in-differences design to measure reductions in aggressive reporting by U.S. firms relative to 
Canadian firms. Here, we find that reductions in aggressive reporting are significantly greater for 
U.S. firms relative to Canadian firms. 
As a final approach, we consider whether reductions in aggressive reporting vary by the 
strength of the firm’s internal compliance and reporting programs. By exploiting cross-sectional 
differences in changes that relate specifically to our context, we can increase confidence that our 
results relate to the SEC Program (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). The most significant area of 
contention for U.S. firms with the introduction of the WB Program was the ability for 
whistleblowers to report directly to the SEC without being required to first report through the 
firm’s internal reporting system implemented under SOX. Firms argued that internal systems 
allow companies to comply with regulations and deal with irregularities on a timely manner 
thereby mitigating investor harm. However, BMW (2017) report that firms lobbying against the 
WB Program in 2010 had weaker internal reporting systems than non-lobbying firms, and that 
                                                
2 Major provisions of Dodd-Frank that impact the financial sector include: the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which 
monitors the financial stability of financial firms deemed “too big to fail”; the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which 
seeks to prevent predatory mortgage lending; and the Volcker Rule, which restricts ways in which banks can invest. 
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investor response to the SEC WB Program was most positive for firms with weaker programs. 
The positive market response for weaker firms suggests that the market anticipated net benefits 
for these firms. 
Using a sample of 224 firms with ratings of internal reporting program quality just prior to 
the introduction of the SEC WB Program from BMW (2017), we examine how changes in 
aggressive reporting vary with internal compliance and reporting program quality. Consistent 
with the BMW (2017) results on perceived costs and benefits of the new program, we find that 
reductions in aggressive reporting are greater for firms with weaker internal reporting programs. 
We further consider three aspects of the internal programs – program efficacy, independence 
from management, and whistleblower protection. Reductions in aggressive reporting are 
significantly increasing in the latter two dimensions. That is, reductions in aggressive reporting 
are most significant for firms where, prior to the introduction of the rules, employees could not 
report irregularities to a group independent from management and where whistleblower 
protection was weak. This suggests that the benefits to the new WB Program are most prevalent 
for firms where systems for employee reporting of fraud were weakest at the time of its 
introduction.  
As one mechanism for improving financial reporting is through improved internal controls, 
we also consider changes in internal controls around the introduction of the new rules. 
Controlling for other determinants of internal control weaknesses (ICWs), we find that the 
reporting of ICWs decreased significantly in the years following the introduction of the SEC WB 
Program for both Section 404 and 302 disclosures. We also consider whether firms improve their 
internal compliance and reporting programs. If employees at firms with weak compliance 
programs have greater incentives to report externally, we expect those firms will strengthen 
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internal programs in the hopes of encouraging potential whistleblowers to report internally first 
to allow them to deal with issues on a timely and proactive basis. Using specific Section 302 
disclosures that relate to internal programs, we find that weaknesses relating to a firm’s internal 
WB Policy (including ethics hotlines) decrease significantly following the SEC rules.  
We make several contributions to the literature. To our knowledge, this is the first market-
wide empirical evidence on the ex post effects of the SEC WB Program. We document a 
reduction in aggressive reporting for U.S. firms following the WB Program, thereby providing 
evidence on the effect of the Program on deterring fraud. We also find that fewer firms report 
ICWs and fewer firms report weaknesses related specifically to their internal compliance and 
reporting programs. These findings provide important evidence of significant benefits of the SEC 
WB Program of Dodd-Frank Act for deterring financial reporting fraud and should be of interest 
to investors and regulators, particularly at a time when provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are 
being questioned and in some cases repealed or modified.3 
We also contribute to the recent literature on the role of whistleblowers in detecting fraud 
and the benefits of WB Programs that provide monetary incentives to whistleblowers. Call, 
Martin, Sharp and Wilde (2016) examine SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement 
actions since SOX. They find that when a whistleblower is involved in the action, regulators are 
able to impose higher penalties for the firms and their employees implicated in the fraud, obtain 
longer prison sentences for culpable employees, and reduce the overall time to discovery. 
Regarding the effectiveness of regulation, Lee (2016) considers US state adoptions of the False 
Claims Act (FCA) which provides monetary awards to whistleblowers who bring to light fraud 
                                                
3 In June 2017, the Trump administration introduced plans to weaken elements of the Dodd-Frank Act including 
curbing the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and exempting banks with less than $10 billion 
in assets from the Volker Rule. Earlier in the month, Republicans had introduced more sweeping legislation in the 
House proposing to repeal 40 provisions of Dodd-Frank. While the legislation passed by a vote of 233-186, it was 
not expected to clear the Senate in its original form.  
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against that state’s pension fund investments. She finds that the introduction of whistleblower 
regulations in a given state significantly reduces ex ante estimates of accounting fraud in that 
state. BMW (2017) analyze investor reactions to a number of key event dates leading to the 
introduction of the SEC WB Program. They find that investor reaction is more positive for 
lobbying than non-lobbying firms, suggesting that investors expect the benefits on the new rules 
to exceed the costs, particularly for those firms most affected by the new rules. In this study, we 
find a significant reduction in aggressive reporting for publicly traded US firms following the 
introduction of the SEC WB provisions. Collectively, these findings underscore the important 
role that whistleblowers play in detecting fraud and the significant benefits of whistleblower 
“bounty” regulatory programs in deterring and detecting fraud. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
The SEC WB Program 
The idea of an SEC whistleblower program was first introduced in a testimony by then SEC 
Chair Mary Shapiro before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
on March 26, 2009. 4 In response to the financial crisis, Shapiro acknowledged the critical need 
for regulatory reform with a focus on enhanced investor protection and securities regulation. One 
element of the broad plans laid out in her testimony included “…a request for authority to 
compensate whistleblowers who bring us well-documented evidence of fraudulent activity.” 
Shapiro later officially requested a WB Program in July 2009, citing criticism of the SEC’s 
handling of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme and the need for the agency to incentivize 
                                                
4 Testimony by Mary L. Shapiro, March 26, 2009. Retrieved from: 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts032609mls.htm. 
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whistleblowers and revamp the process for evaluating the tips received.5 A detailed proposal of 
the plan was released on November 3, 2010 with an invitation for public comment; the Agency 
received over 1,000 submissions.  
As reported by BMW (2017) in their analysis of comment letters to the SEC, support for the 
proposal was mixed. While individuals were strongly in favor of the rules, other groups 
including lawyers and non-investor groups were mixed and the 283 corporate respondents were 
unanimously negative. For corporations, the most significant point of contention was that the 
proposed rules did not require whistleblowers to first report misconduct through company 
internal compliance and reporting programs prior to reporting to the SEC. Firms’ internal 
compliance programs were previously formalized under SOX to improve financial reporting 
practices. Section 406 of SOX requires companies to disclose whether the company has adopted 
a written Code of Ethics, which should be “designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote 
compliance with governmental laws, rules, and regulations; prompt internal reporting of 
violations to an appropriate person identified within the Code; and accountability for adherence 
to the Code”. Section 301 assigns responsibility of internal reporting to the audit committee, for 
“the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints regarding accounting, internal control or 
auditing matters” and for “confidential, anonymous submission by employees with concerns 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” SOX also provides anti-retaliation 
protection for whistleblowers, although this protection has proven to be weak (Dworkin 2007).  
As stated in a letter from the Association of Corporate Counsel and undersigned by 250 
corporations, failure to require the use of internal compliance programs would have unintended 
results: “…first, by undermining internal compliance and reporting systems that allow 
                                                
5 Testimony by Mary L. Shapiro, July 14, 2009. Retrieved from: 
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071409mls.htm 	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responsible companies to comply with critical regulations and conduct themselves in an ethical 
manner; and second, by proposing an alternative system which fails to replace existing corporate 
reporting systems with any effective mechanism to ensure that companies obtain early warnings 
of burgeoning failures or frauds within their organizations.”  
The final SEC rules were adopted on May 11, 2011. While the rules do not require internal 
reporting, they were modified to allow the SEC to provide higher financial rewards to those 
whistleblowers who first report violations through channels internal to the corporation prior to 
contacting the SEC.6  
The Role of Whistleblowers 
One concern about the new regulations was that the SEC would receive a number of 
frivolous submissions thereby impeding the SEC’s ability to process tips received under the 
program. Bowen, Call and Rajgopal (2010) consider the economic consequences of 
whistleblowing prior to the introduction of the SEC rule by examining whistleblower allegations 
reported in the media and a broad sample of whistleblower retaliation cases filed with the US 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). They find that markets react 
significantly negatively to whistleblower allegations, and that firms targeted with whistleblowing 
allegations are more likely to experience earnings restatements and shareholder lawsuits. They 
also experience weaker future operating and stock market performance. Although the media 
sample is likely to include only significant cases of misconduct, their findings on the OSHA 
sample provide evidence that whistleblower allegations do not appear to be frivolous, on 
average. Call, Martin, Sharp and Wilde (2016) consider whether whistleblower involvement in 
                                                
6 Evidence to date suggests that many whistleblowers still report through internal compliance systems - the SEC has 
reported that approximately 80 percent of tips from employees are reported internally first (Henning 2016). 
However, the concern remains that the program will undercut the effectiveness of existing internal compliance and 
reporting programs.  	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enforcement efforts results in more severe enforcement actions. They examine a database of 
employee whistleblowing allegations and enforcement actions by the SEC and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) enforcement actions since SOX. They find that when a whistleblower is involved 
in the action, regulators are able to impose higher monetary penalties for the firms and third-
party defendants, such as auditors. They also find that whistleblower involvement is associated 
with longer prison sentences for culpable employees, and that enforcement proceedings are able 
to begin more quickly.   
The FCA Bounty Program  
Several studies have considered the effectiveness of whistleblower provisions under the 
FCA. The FCA includes a qui tam provision that allows individuals who are not affliliated with 
the government to file actions on behalf of the government and receive a portion of any 
recovered damages (usually 15-25 percent), often referred to as “bounties”. Dyck, Morse and 
Zingales (2010) provide some indirect evidence on the effectiveness of whistleblower provisions 
under the FCA in detecting fraud. They examine fraud cases in significant U.S. class-action 
lawsuits to determine who the actor was who first identified the fraud. They find that while 
employees identified fraud in 18 percent of the sample overall, they represent 41 percent of the 
cases in the health care sector covered by the whistleblower bounty incentives under the FCA. 
Lee (2016) considers US state adoptions of the FCA with qui tam provisions, where 
whistleblowers can claim financial rewards by providing evidence of securities fraud involving 
state funds (e.g. the New York State Teachers Retirement System holding an investment in a 
firm that commits fraud). For a sample of firms held by state pension funds that have adopted the 
FCA, she finds that, following the adoption of the FCA, ex ante estimates of accounting fraud 
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decline by 7 percent for these state-held firms. These findings suggest that whistleblowers can 
play a role in the detection and deterring of misconduct. 
The SEC WB Program and Reporting 
The findings by Lee (2016) suggest that whistleblower bounty programs can impact financial 
reporting outcomes. However, the SEC program covers all publicly traded companies whereas 
state FCA provisions only impact firms held by state pension funds and only in those states with 
qui tam provisions.  Therefore, the SEC must process a much higher number of complaints. The 
Agency has received over 18,000 tips since 2011, with the number increasing each year – the 
agency received 4,218 tips in 2016 alone. To the extent that managers do not believe that the 
SEC can effectively process this volume of information, they are less likely to change behavior 
following the introduction of the rules.  
Another challenge to the new rules is efforts by managers to defy or circumvent the new SEC 
rules by muzzling whistleblowers. “Pretaliation” refers to the use of confidentiality and other 
employment agreements to prevent whistleblowers from providing information to the SEC. In 
October 2014, eight Democratic members of Congress sent a letter to the SEC Chair expressing 
concerns that employment agreements were potentially threating the effectiveness of the SEC’s 
program. In 2015 the SEC announced its first enforcement action against a company for 
pretaliation. (The SEC charged KBR Inc. for requiring employees to sign confidentiality 
agreements that threatened them with discipline and termination if they disclosed suspected 
wrongdoing to anyone outside KBR without the company’s approval.) If pretaliation is 
widespread, the new SEC rules are unlikely to be effective in deterring fraud.  
While these factors threaten the effectiveness of the SEC WB Program, BMW (2017) 
provide positive early evidence on its potential effectiveness. They examine investor responses 
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to key events leading up to the introduction of the new rules. They compare firms that lobbied 
against the rules – assumed to be most affected by the rules - to a sample of matched control 
firms. They find that short-window stock returns are significantly more positive for lobby firms, 
suggesting that investors expect net benefits to firms following the introduction of the rules. 
Given these findings and the enhanced resources that Congress has devoted to the SEC program, 
we predict that the SEC WB Program rules are likely to be effective in reducing aggressive 
reporting: 
H1: Aggressive reporting declines following the introduction of the SEC WB Program. 
 
Firms Most Likely to Be Impacted 
A challenge of this research is attributing changes in aggressive reporting over the sample 
period to the introduction of the WB Program and not other simultaneous changes. One approach 
is to exploit cross-sectional differences in changes that can be attributed to the SEC WB 
Program. This requires having convincing a priori predictions on how the SEC rules 
differentially affect firms (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). We consider a key firm characteristic in this 
context  - existing internal compliance programs that companies were required to establish under 
SOX. As noted above, firms were concerned that the new SEC program would undermine 
existing internal programs and hamper a firm’s ability to learn of misconduct and address issues 
on a timely basis. Since the SEC program provides an alternative channel for reporting 
misconduct, companies most likely to be affected are those with weaker internal compliance and 
reporting programs where whistleblowers are more likely to avoid using the internal channel and 
report directly to the SEC channel instead. 
Research on whistleblowing suggests that certain dimensions of an internal compliance and 
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reporting program influence the likelihood of whistleblower reporting misconduct internally. 
Employees are more likely to report internally and less likely to report externally when there is 
an organizational emphasis on internal compliance systems (Feldman and Lobel 2008). 
Employees are more likely to report wrongdoing when they think supervisors want to learn about 
the wrongdoing and that they will take action, if warranted (Miceli et al. 2008). Research also 
indicates that a whistleblower program is more effective when an employee has reporting options 
including the option to report directly to the board of directors rather than to managers.  Having 
reporting options helps circumvent the problem of “blocking and filtering” by middle managers 
and executives (Moberly 2006). 7  Fear of retaliation is also an important dimension. 
Whistleblowers are less likely to report internally when they perceive a threat of retaliation by 
the organization, immediate supervisors, or co-workers (Near and Miceli 1996).  
We predict that firms most likely to be affected by the SEC whistleblower regulations are 
firms that had weak internal compliance and reporting programs when the regulations were 
introduced. BMW (2017) find that investor responses to announcements relating to the 
introduction of the SEC WB Program were more significantly more positive for firms with weak 
internal compliance programs. This suggests that investors expect greater benefits of regulation 
for these firms. If firms with weaker internal compliance and reporting programs face greater 
threat of external rather than internal reporting by employees, they are more likely to alter their 
behavior in response to the new rules: 
 H2: The reduction in aggressive reporting following the introduction of the SEC WB Program 
is greater for firms with weak internal compliance and reporting programs. 
 
                                                
7 A number of supporters of the SEC proposal argued against the SOX system of reporting internally noting that employees 
should not be required to report concerns to their “corrupt bosses”. 
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Mechanism for Change following the SEC WB Program   
Given greater threat of external reporting by employees, firms have incentives to make 
structural changes to reduce the probability of fraud from occurring. One potential avenue is to 
improve internal control systems. Internal controls are those procedures within a company that 
are designed to reasonably ensure compliance with the company’s policies, including financial 
reporting policies. Since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, all publicly traded US 
companies have been required to devise and maintain internal controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurance that financial statements are prepared in conformity with GAAP. In 
response to a number of high-profile financial reporting fraud cases, SOX later enhanced this 
responsibility with the stated goal: “To protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities laws, and for other purposes.” 
Section 302 of SOX requires that the CEO and CFO of a company certify that the disclosure 
processes and controls that are in place are capable of consistently producing financial 
information stakeholders can rely on. Auditors must report on the reliability of management’s 
assessment of these controls under Section 404. Internal controls are one mechanism for ensuring 
high quality financial reporting.  
While there is some debate in the literature over whether better internal controls can reduce 
intentional misrepresentation resulting from management override of internal controls or 
collusion (Kinney 2005), recent research does support an association between ICWs and 
reporting quality. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and LaFond (2008) argue that weak internal 
controls increase both unintentional and intentional errors. If controls are weak, information will 
be more noisy and less reliable making it more difficult for managers to determine reliable 
accrual amounts. Further, managers of firms with weak internal controls can more readily 
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override the controls and intentionally prepare biased accrual estimates. They find that firms that 
report ICWs have significantly larger positive and larger negative abnormal accruals and that 
firms that remediate their weaknesses report an increase in accrual quality. Doyle et al (2007a) 
also report significantly lower accrual quality for firms reporting ICWs. Chan, Farrell and Lee 
(2008) document a positive association between ICWs and restatements, and Donelson, Ege and 
McInnis (2016) find that firms that disclose material ICWs are significantly more likely to have a 
future fraud revelation, particularly for entity-level controls. This research supports an 
association between internal control quality strength and financial reporting quality. 
If firms improve internal controls following the introduction of the SEC WB Program, the 
frequency of ICWs should decrease: 
H3: The incidence of internal control weaknesses declines following the introduction of the 
SEC WB Program. 
 
More directly, we also consider whether firms improve their internal compliance and 
reporting programs. If employees at firms with weak compliance programs have incentives to 
report externally, those firms can respond by strengthening those programs in the hopes of 
encouraging potential whistleblowers to report internally first: 
H4: The incidence of internal control weaknesses relating to internal compliance programs 
declines following the introduction of the SEC WB Program. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Event Periods 
The WB Program was approved by the SEC on May 25, 2011 and became effective on 
August 12, 2011. However, the SEC first introduced the idea for the program in 2009 and 
released the detailed proposal of the rules in December 2010. Further, a whistleblower was 
eligible for an award for original information provided on or after July 22, 2010 so long as they 
complied with all of the rules when they did become effective. Given these provisions, we define 
the PRE WB Program period as 2006 to 2009 and the POST period as 2010-2014.8  
 
Sample and Variable Measurement – Abnormal Accruals Analysis 
Our sample selection process is outlined in Table 1 column 1. We obtain our sample from the 
Annual North American Compustat database for the years 2006 to 2015. (We require 2015 data 
to estimate accruals.) Since the SEC WB Program covers violations of the federal securities 
laws, we focus our analysis on US public companies.9  We select firms where the Foreign 
Incorporate Codes (FIC) equals “USA” and where the Stock Exchange Code (EXCHG) equals 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 or 18. To reduce the likelihood that our findings are driven by other 
changes introduced by the Dodd Frank Act and because traditional accruals measures are not 
meaningful for financial sector firms, we eliminate all firms with SIC codes in the 6000-6999 
range. For the accruals analysis, we require that firms have non-missing data for the required 
regression variables, total assets greater than zero, and that each firm/year belong to a SIC two-
digit group with at least 20 observations. This yields a sample of 10,138 firm-year observations.  
 
                                                8	  We later consider the robustness of our findings to the definition of PRE and POST.  9	  Note that the program can also affect private companies that violate securities laws, such as in providing falsified information 
when seeking investors. 
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Measuring the Impact of the SEC WB Program on Aggressive Financial Reporting 
 Our measure of aggressive financial reporting is based on the McNichols (2002) accruals 
measure adapted from Dechow and Dichev (2002) where accruals are mapped into past, current 
and future operating cash flows, changes in revenue and property, plant and equipment. Jones, 
Krishnan and Melendrez (2008) compare 10 measures of earnings management to assess whether 
these models detect actual cases of fraud and find that the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
McNichols (2002) accruals measures consistently exhibit the highest associations with fraud 
cases. We measure abnormal accruals as: 
ACCit/Ait-1 = ( λ 0 + λ 1CFOit-1/Ait-2 + λ 2CFOit/Ait-1 + λ 3CFOit+1/Ait + λ 4△REVit/Ait-1 + λ5PPEit/Ait-1)] + εit        (1) 
where ACCit is income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations at the 
year t, Ait is total assets at year t, CFOit is cash flow from operations in the year t, △REVit is 
change in revenue in the year t, and PPEit is gross property plant and equipment at the beginning 
of the year t. We estimate the model cross-sectionally by two-digit SIC group and by year (Ali 
and Zhang 2015) requiring a minimum of 20 observations per group/year. All necessary data is 
obtained from Compustat (North America). Residuals from the estimated model represent 
abnormal, or discretionary, accruals. We use the absolute value of this residual, ABS_DA, as our 
measure of aggressive reporting. Greater values represent more aggressive reporting, and can be 
either income-increasing (such as premature recognition of revenue) or decreasing (such as 
overstatement of expenses to create “cookie jar” reserves). 
To assess the impact of the SEC WB program on aggressive reporting we estimate the 
following Tobit regression (we use a Tobit model given that observations are truncated at zero): 
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ABS_DA = α0 + α1POST + α2RESTRUCTURE + α3GROWTH + α4%LOSS + α5INVENTORY + 
α6INT_INTENSITY +α7NO_INTENSITY + α8CAP_INTENSITY + α9SIZE + α10BM + 
α11ZSCORE + α12WRITE-OFF + α13AUDITOR + α14STD_CFO + α15STD_SALE + α16 
M&A + ∑INDUSTRY + ε        (2) 
We define POST as an indicator equal to one for firm observations in years 2010 to 2014, 
and zero otherwise. We include a number of additional measures to control for innate firm 
characteristics that affect the measurement of accruals. Firms with restructurings 
(RESTRUCTURE), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), or poor financial performance (ZSCORE) 
record larger asset impairments and write-offs (WRITE-OFF), affecting accruals. Firms 
exhibiting rapid growth (GROWTH) and low book-to-market ratios (BM) tend to build up 
inventory (INVENTORY) in anticipation of future increased sales (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). 
Accruals quality is positively related to firm size (SIZE) and negatively related to the portion of 
losses reported by the firm (%LOSS) (Dechow and Dichev 2002). To capture the effect of asset 
structure on accruals, we include measures for investment in intangible assets (INT_INTENSITY), 
lack of intangible assets (NO_INTENSITY) and property, plant and equipment (CAP_INTENSITY) 
(Francis et al. 2005). Given that firms with more volatile operations have more variable accruals, 
we include measures for the standard deviation of operating cash flows (STD_CFO) and sales 
(STD_SALE) (Dechow and Dichev 2002). We also control for auditor quality (AUDITOR) by 
including an indicator variable for the six largest audit firms (Francis et al. 1999). We describe 
the measurement of these variables in the Appendix, Panel A. 
Table 2 panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables in equation (1). To control for 
outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st  and 99th percentiles. The mean (median) 
for our measure of interest ABS_DA is 0.051 (0.032), similar to previous studies. We report 
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considerable variation for many of the independent variables such as size and intangible and 
capital intensity highlighting the importance in controlling for these variables in our regressions. 
A number of firms report involvement in restructuring and merger and acquisitions activities.  
On the other hand, a high proportion of firms (84.7 percent) are audited by one of the largest six 
audit firms. 
 
Results - The Impact of the SEC WB Program on Aggressive Reporting –Multivariate Analysis 
We report the results for the estimation of regression equation (1) in Table 3. We note that 
many of the control variables are significant in explaining abnormal accruals. In column 1, the 
dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_DA) estimated using the 
cross-sectional McNichols (2002) model. Here we find that the coefficient for POST is negative 
and significant at the 0.01 level, consistent with aggressive reporting decreasing following the 
introduction of the SEC WB Program. Relative to the intercept of 0.070, the negative coefficient 
of -0.008 suggests that absolute abnormal accruals decreased by 11%. We also consider whether 
this reduction applies to both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. 
In column 2, the dependent variable is the value of positive abnormal accruals (POS_DA) using 
the cross-sectional McNichols (2002) model; in column 3, the dependent variable is the value of 
negative abnormal accruals (NEG_DA). We find significant changes for both in the direction 
predicted – reduced positive abnormal accruals (coefficient of -0.006, significant at the 0.01 
level), and reduced negative abnormal accruals (coefficient of 0.0.13 significant at the 0.01 
level). This evidence provides support for Hypothesis 1 that aggressive reporting decreased 
following the introduction of the new SEC whistleblower rules. 
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Additional Tests 
 As discussed earlier, we define POST as an indicator equal to one for firm observations in 
years 2010 to 2014 since the detailed proposal of the rules was released in December 2010 and 
whistleblowers were eligible for an award for original information starting in July 2010. In 
sensitivity tests, we define TRANSITION as an indicator equal to one for firm observations in 
2010 and POST2 as an indicator equal to one for firm observations in years 2011 to 2014 since 
the rules were officially enacted in 2011. Results (untabulated) indicate that the coefficient for 
TRANSITION is significantly negative (at the 0.01) for the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
and for positive accruals in columns 1 and 2 and significantly positive for negative accruals (at 
the 0.01 level) for column 3. Similarly, the coefficient for POST2 is also significantly negative 
(at the 0.01 level) for columns 1 and 2 and significantly positive (at the 0.01 level) for column 3. 
This finding is consistent with firms being aware of the regulatory proposals and already taking 
action in response to the proposed rules in 2010.  
In columns 4 through 6 we include an indicator variable QUI TAM to consider the impact of 
the whistleblower regulations on a subset of firms already covered under the qui tam provision of 
the FCA. Following Dyck et al. (2010), we define QUI TAM as an indicator variable equal to one 
for firms in the health care sector where the government is a significant buyer: firms in drugs, 
drug proprietaries, and druggists' sundries (SIC code 5122); health care providers (SIC codes 
8000-8099); health care related firms in Business Services (health care firms in SIC codes 7380 
and 7389); and, firms that appear on the “100 companies receiving the largest dollar volume of 
prime contract awards” list in any of the three years before 2010, and zero otherwise. Since firms 
with government contracts were already covered by the whistleblower provisions of the FCA 
from the beginning of our entire sample period, they are less likely to be impacted by the new 
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SEC rules. At the bottom of the table, we report the significance of the sum of the coefficients 
POST and POST + POST*QUIT TAM to test whether abnormal accruals decline significantly for 
these firms. As reported in column 4, the sum of the coefficients is not significantly different 
from zero. We report similar results in columns 5 and 6. These results suggest that the SEC 
whistleblower provisions did not significantly impact firms already covered by whistleblower 
provisions under the FCA.  
In untabulated results we also consider an alternative measure for aggressive reporting. Using 
a sample of firms charged by the SEC for having committed fraud, Beneish (1999) develops a 
model that estimates the probability of a firm manipulating its earnings using financial 
statements variables from the forensic accounting literature. Following Beneish, Lee and Nelson 
(2013) we use the coefficients estimated from the Beneish model and classify firms as earnings 
manipulators when their score exceeds 1.78. We then test for changes in the probability of 
manipulation by estimating a regression model that controls for other determinants of fraud. 
Similar to our findings in Table 3, we find that the probability of manipulation declines 
significantly in the POST period (p<0.05) for our sample firms. 
To provide further evidence that the results in Table 3 columns 1 through 3 are not driven by 
other changes over the sample period, we compare U.S. firms to a sample of Canadian firms over 
the same period. Canada did not have a whistleblower program in place during our sample period 
2006 – 2014.10  As described in Table 1 column 2, our sample of Canadian firms excludes firms 
in the financial industry and cross-listed firms. Our resulting sample is 1,488 firm-years over the 
                                                10	  The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) was considering introducing a whistleblower program similar to the U.S. during our 
sample period. The Commission began discussing possible tools to enhance enforcement in 2011 and published a consultation 
paper in February of 2015. New rules similar to the SEC were introduced in October 2015. Many of the Canadian firms in our 
sample are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and are therefore subject to regulation by the OSC. To the extent that Canadian 
firms anticipated the introduction of these new regulations, then our tests our biased against us finding evidence of reduced 
aggressive reporting for U.S. firms in difference-in-differences tests. 
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sample period. As reported in Table 2 panel B, the mean (median) for our measure of aggressive 
reporting ABS_DA is 0.078 (0.049).    
Results for our difference-in-differences tests are reported in Table 4. Here, we include an 
indicator variable TREATMENT that equals one for U.S. firms and zero otherwise, and an 
interaction term POST*TREATMENT for changes in aggressive reporting for U.S. firms relative 
to Canadian firms. As reported in column 1, we find that the coefficient for the variable 
TREATMENT is significantly negative, suggesting that Canadian firms report more aggressively, 
on average, than U.S. firms. The coefficient of interest for the variable POST*TREATMENT is 
also negative and significant at the 0.05 level. In columns 2 and 3 we reported results separately 
for positive and negative abnormal accruals. The interaction term is not significant for the 
regression model including only POS_DA (column 2) but is significant for the regression 
including only NEG_DA (column 3). These results suggest that U.S. firms reduced their level of 
aggressive reporting more significantly than Canadian firms following the introduction of the 
SEC whistleblower program in the U.S., particularly for negative abnormal accruals. 
 
Testing for Cross-sectional Variation in the Impact of the SEC WB Program on Aggressive 
Reporting 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the reduction in aggressive financial reporting is more 
pronounced for firms with weaker internal compliance and reporting programs prior to the new 
WB Program. Ideally we would like to measure the strength of a firm’s internal compliance 
program, as employees are more likely to report internally if their internal programs are strong. 
Companies describe their internal compliances program within their Code of Ethics. While a 
company’s current Code of Ethics is typically available on its website, companies are not 
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required to (and generally do not) archive previous Codes. This is problematic because we 
require evaluations of internal compliance and reporting programs when the SEC rules were first 
introduced as companies may have responded to the WB Program by improving their internal 
programs to encourage employees to report misconduct internally first. Given that Codes are not 
archived, we rely on data from BMW (2017) who construct a firm-level index of internal 
compliance and reporting program strength for a sample of firms who lobbied against the SEC 
WB Program and a matched control sample. BMW (2017) develop their coding along these three 
dimensions of interest and use the recommendations provided in the International Chamber of 
Commerce guideline on whistleblowing (ICC 2008) to guide them. They also use several 
independent sources to ensure construct validity.11  
We are interested in the three aspects of program strength reported in BMW (2017) as they 
relate to the probability of an employee reporting internally: the importance that the firm places 
on the program within the Code (WB_PE - program efficacy); the availability of reporting 
options including those independent from management (WB_IR – independence of reporting); 
and, the protection of the whistle blower (WB_PROT – whistleblower protection). Based on the 
BMW (2017) coding, the maximum scores for each category are: 3 for WB_PE, 8 for WB_IR and 
7 for WB_PROT. WB_TOT is the sum of the three components with a total maximum score of 18. 
We reverse code these scores (maximum score – actual score) so that higher scores represent 
weaker internal compliance programs. The total sample from BMW (2017) with necessary data 
for our tests is 224 firms and 1,502 firm-years. 
                                                11	  For a detailed description of the index and the validity tests conducted on the measure, see BMW (2017) section 5 and 
Appendix 1. 
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To test hypothesis 2, we include the variable WB_TOT and the interaction variable 
POST*WB_TOT in equation (1). We expect reductions for aggressive reporting to be greater for 
firms with weaker internal programs, and therefore predict a negative sign for this variable. We 
report results from our tests in Table 4. In column (1) we include the BMW (2017) variable 
WB_TOT and the interaction variable POST*WB_TOT in equation (1). The coefficient for the 
interaction variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Given that higher 
levels of WB_TOT denote weaker internal compliance programs, these findings suggest that 
reductions for aggressive reporting are greater for firms with weaker programs.  In columns (2), 
(3) and (4) we replace WB_TOT and with the subcomponent scores: WB_PE for program 
efficacy, WB_IR for independence of reporting, and WB_PROT for protection of the 
whistleblower. The interaction term for WB_PE is not statistically different from zero but both 
WB_IR and WB_PROT are negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests 
that aggressive reporting decreased more for firms where employees had fewer reporting options 
independent from management, and for firms that did not promise strong protection to potential 
whistleblowers. These firms may have perceived the likelihood of employees reporting directly 
to the SEC to be higher than for other firms, providing a strong motivation to reduce the 
likelihood of misconduct. Overall, these findings support Hypothesis 2. 
In column (5) we also consider whether reductions differ across firms that lobbied against 
the new rules compared to a control group of firms that did not lobby. Here the interaction term 
is not significant at conventional levels. Therefore, while BMW (2017) find that lobby firms had 
weaker internal compliance programs than non-lobby firms on average, variation in compliance 
program strength between individual firms within each group are still significant, and 
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compliance program strength appears to be a better predictor of changes in reporting than the act 
of lobbying itself.  
Sample and Variable Measurement – Internal Controls Analysis 
In this section, we consider the impact of the SEC whistleblower program on firms’ internal 
control systems. Our sample selection for this analysis is reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1. 
For this analysis we exclude firms with missing SOX Section 404 (Section 302) audit data from 
Audit Analytics and/or missing data for the regression variables. Because SOX 404 was not 
effective for non-accelerated filers until 2007 / 2008, we also exclude firms with a market 
capitalization of less than $75 million in 2006. The final sample size for the Section 404 (302) 
analysis is 19,611 (21,260). 
Direct measures of internal control quality are not publicly available. Most researchers rely 
on the reporting of ICWs to proxy for (poor) internal control quality. Section 302 ICWs are those 
reported by management that relate to deficiencies in the disclosure processes and controls 
needed for reliable financial reporting. For Section 404, auditors attest to managements’ 
assertions regarding these controls. If auditors are conservative in their identification of material 
weaknesses, Section 404 weaknesses may include a higher proportion of less severe ICWs than 
Section 302. Doyle et al. (2007a) consider ICW reporting under both Section 302 and Section 
404 regimes and find significantly lower accrual quality for firms reporting ICWs under Section 
302 but not Section 404.  They conclude that Section 404 ICWs are less informative than Section 
302 in identifying firms with real financial reporting concerns. On the other hand Rice and 
Weber (2012) find that firms are strategic in their Section 404 disclosures, and that detection and 
disclosure incentives play a role in whether a material weakness is disclosed. Given limitations 
of each measure, we consider both reporting regimes in our analysis. 
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To assess the impact of the SEC WB Program on internal control quality, we estimate the 
following Probit regression for the probability of the company experiencing an internal control 
weakness reported under Section 302: 
Pr (ICW) =  β0 + β1POST + β2MARKETCAP + β3FIRM AGE + β4AGGREGATE LOSS  
+ β5SEGMENTS + Β6FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS + β7ACQUISITION VALUE  
+ β8EXTREME SALES GROWTH + β9RESTRUCTURE + ε (2) 
The dependent variable, ICW, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a SOX 
Section 404 (302) internal control weakness reported in Audit Analytics during the fiscal year 
and zero otherwise. Again, we define POST as an indicator equal to one for firm observations in 
years 2010 to 2014, and zero otherwise. We follow Doyle et al. (2007b) and include a number of 
control variables for determinants of weaknesses in internal control. These include: firm size 
measured as market capitalization (MARKETCAP), as larger firms have greater resources and 
enjoy greater economies of scale when developing internal control; the age of the firm (FIRM 
AGE), as older firms have more developed systems; incidence of losses in the current and prior 
year (AGGREGATE LOSS) as firms with stronger financial health have stronger internal control 
systems; number of geographic and operating segments (SEGMENTS) and foreign transactions 
(FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS) to control for the complexity of operations; acquisitions 
(ACQUISITION VALUE) and rapid growth (EXTREME SALES GROWTH) as these firms may 
outgrow existing internal controls and need time to establish new procedures: and firms 
undergoing restructuring (RESTRUCTURING CHARGE) to control for the effect of downsizing 
and increased complexity of accruals and write-downs during restructuring on internal control. 
We describe the measurement of these variables in the Appendix, Panel B. 
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If firms perceive a threat of employees reporting misconduct directly to the SEC, they have 
incentives to make structural changes to reduce the probability of misconduct. Hypothesis 3 
predicts that one way to improve financial reporting and reduce the probability of misconduct is 
through the improvement of internal control systems. Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the 
variables in regression equation (2) for the Section 404 sample in Panels A and for the 302 
sample in Panel B. The mean value for the Section 404 (302) sample of ICWs is 0.061 (0.091). 
The average firm in our Section 404 (302) sample is 19.8 (20.2) years suggesting that internal 
controls are likely well established for many of the sample firms. However, firms report 
organizational complexity through reporting segments (means of 3.2 and 3.3 in Panels A and B) 
and foreign transactions (means of 0.32 in both Panels A and B). Also, a number of firms report 
losses, acquisitions and restructuring and extreme sales growth all of which pose challenges to 
establishing and maintaining effective internal controls. 
Results for the estimation of regression equation (2) are reported in Table 7. In column 1, 
we report results using the dependent variable, ICW, from the Section 404 reporting regime; 
column 2 reports results under Section 302. Coefficients for the control variables are generally 
significant and consistent with Doyle et al. (2007b). The results for our coefficient of interest, 
POST, are consistent with our predictions in Hypothesis 3. For both regimes, the coefficient is 
negative and significant at 0.01 level providing evidence that the frequency of internal control 
weaknesses decreased significantly following the introduction of the SEC WB Program.  
Internal Compliance and Reporting Programs 
As previously noted, it is not possible to evaluate the quality of a firm’s internal compliance 
and reporting programs when the SEC rules were first introduced, therefore it is not possible to 
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measure the change in quality directly for the overall sample. Instead, we rely on disclosures of 
ineffective controls under Section 302 of SOX reported by Audit Analytics. The category most 
relevant to our analysis is Code 82 – “inadequate or not-implemented internal whistleblower 
policy” (including an ethics or anonymous hotline). We also consider two additional categories 
that may also be related to the effectiveness of the internal compliance programs. Because the 
design of internal programs is described in the firm’s Code of Ethics, we consider Code 84 – “a 
problem involving the formulation or implementation of an effective Code of Ethics”. 
Effectiveness of the Code of Ethics is dependent on the support by management in 
communicating, supporting and enforcing the code and employees are more likely to report 
wrongdoing when they believe management wants to learn of misconduct and is committed to 
taking action against misconduct. Therefore we also consider Code 67 – a problem involving 
senior management tone or “tone at the top”. For this analysis, we estimate equation (2) where 
the dependent variable, ICW, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a SOX Section 
302 Code 82 (and/or 84 and/or 67) weakness reported in Audit Analytics during the fiscal year 
and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that firms have incentives to improve their internal compliance 
programs after the introduction of the rules to reduce the likelihood of employees reporting 
externally to the SEC rather than using internal channels. We collect data on the reporting of 
ineffective controls from Audit Analytics for the Code 82, Code 84 and Code 67. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 8. We see that the number and frequency of ineffective control 
disclosures is very low. For example, only 32 firms (0.51%) report a Code 82 weakness, 62 
(0.98%) a Code 84 and 52 (0.82%) a Code 67 weakness in 2010. Still, when we compare 
frequencies before and after the introduction of the SEC rules, we observe a reduction in the 
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frequency of reporting. For Code 82 - “Whistleblower policy/ethics hotline missing/inadequate”  
- the frequency decreases from 0.64% in the PRE period (2006-2009) to 0.34% in the POST 
period (2010 – 2014). Similarly, for Code 84 - “a problem involving the formulation or 
implementation of an effective Code of Ethics” – the frequency decreases from 1.04% to 0.65%, 
and Code 67 - problems involving senior management tone or “tone at the top” – the frequency 
decreases from 1.55% to 0.41%.  
In Table 9 we report the results from the estimation of regression equation (2). One 
challenge for this analysis is the rarity of ICWs in these categories. King and Zeng (2001) note 
that where the binary dependent variable has “dozens to thousands” more zeros than ones, 
standard procedures like logistic regression can seriously underestimate the probability of rare 
events. To address this issue, we employ the Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Firth, 
1993) to reduce potential bias in estimating the effect of the SEC WP program on internal control 
weaknesses12. The dependent variable in column 1 is a weakness in the firm’s internal WB 
Policy (Code 82) and is equal to one if the code appears in any of four quarters in the fiscal year, 
or zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column 2 is a weakness in the firm’s internal WB 
Policy (Code 82) and/or Code of Ethics (Code 84); the dependent variable in column 3 is a 
weakness in the firm’s internal WB Policy (Code 82) and/or Code of Ethics (Code 84) and/or 
Tone at the Top (Code 67).  
A number of the coefficients for the control variables are significant and consistent in sign 
with Doyle et al. (2007b). The likelihood of a weakness in a firm’s internal WB policy is 
increasing in the incidence of losses, organizational complexity (number of segments and foreign 
transactions), and restructuring activities. However, MARKETCAP and FIRM AGE are not 
                                                12	  Leitgöb (2013) compares three ways to deal with rare events: the Exact Logistic Regression, the Bias Correction Method 
proposed by King and Zeng (2001), and Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation proposed by Firth (1993). He finds that the 
Firth method performs best in simulations and estimates are unbiased.	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significant in column 1 suggesting that the likelihood of a weakness is a firm’s internal WB 
policy is not associated with firm size or age. Also, EXTREME GROWTH and ACQUISITION 
VALUE are not significant in any of the three analyses.  
The coefficient for the variable of interest, POST, is negative and significant at the 0.05 
level or higher in all three columns, consistent with our predictions in Hypothesis 4. These 
results are consistent with firms making improvements to internal WB policies, including ethics 
hotlines, after the introduction of the SEC rules. The potential motivation for these 
improvements may have been made to reduce the likelihood of employees reporting externally to 
the SEC rather than using internal channels. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we consider the effect of the SEC WB Program in deterring aggressive 
financial reporting by US firms. We measure aggressive reporting using the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals and document a significant reduction in accruals of approximately 11 percent 
after controlling for other factors known to affect accruals measurement. This reduction is 
observed for both positive and negative accruals. A challenge of our research is attributing 
changes in aggressive reporting over the sample period to the introduction of the WB Program 
and not other simultaneous changes. First, we find that the SEC program did not impact firms 
already covered under whistleblower provisions of the FCA. In additional tests we compare 
changes in reporting for U.S. firms to Canadian firms over the sample time period. In a 
difference-in-differences design, we find that reductions in aggressive reporting are significantly 
greater for U.S. firms than for Canadian firms over the same time period. Further, we also follow 
the suggestion of Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and exploit cross-sectional differences in changes 
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that can be attributed to the SEC WB Program. By using a smaller sample of firms with ratings 
of internal reporting program quality just prior to the introduction of the SEC WB Program from 
BMW (2017), we are able to demonstrate that reductions in aggressive reporting are greater for 
firms with weaker internal reporting programs. Employees of these firms are more likely to 
choose to report to the SEC directly as internal channels provide fewer reporting options 
independent of management and/or provide less protection against retaliation. These findings 
increase our confidence that the changes we observe are attributable to the new regulation. 
We also consider the effect of the SEC WB Program on internal controls. We find that 
reporting of internal control weaknesses decreased significantly in the years following the 
introduction of the SEC WB Program. In additional analysis, we also find a significant decrease 
in the reporting of weaknesses relating specifically to a firm’s internal WB Policy (including 
ethics hotlines), consistent with firms improving internal compliance and reporting systems to 
encourage internal reporting.  
Collectively, our findings provide evidence that the SEC whistleblower program is effective 
in achieving the goal of deterring securities violations as it relates to fraudulent reporting. 
Further research can consider the effect of the program on other securities violations, including 
inside trading, offering fraud, and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables  Definitions  
Panel A: Accruals Analysis 
ABS_DA The absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated by using the cross-
sectional McNichols (2002) model. 
POST An indicator variable that equals one if a firm-year’s fiscal end falls 
between Jan 1, 2010 and Dec 31, 2014, and zero otherwise. 
QUI TAM An indicator variable that equals one if a firm belongs to the one of the 
following: drugs, drug proprietaries, and druggists' sundries (SIC code 
5122); health care providers (SIC codes 8000-8099); health care related 
firms in Business Services (health care firms in SIC codes 7380 and 
7389); and, firms that appear on the “100 companies receiving the 
largest dollar volume of prime contract awards” list in any of the three 
years before 2010; and zero otherwise. 
TREATMENT An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is a U.S. firm, defined 
as FIC code equals “USA” and where the Stock Exchange Code 
(EXCHG) equals 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 or 18, and zero otherwise. 
RESTRUCTURE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is involved in a 
restructuring in the prior three years, and zero otherwise. 
GROWTH The average of annual sale growth rate in the prior three years. 
%LOSS The proportion of the current and prior two (minimum) to four 
(maximum) years that a firm reports negative earnings (ni). 
INVENTORY Inventory (invt) divided by total assets (at) at the beginning of year t. 
INT_INTENSITY Intangible asset intensity measured by the ratio of the sum of 
advertising (xad) and research and development expenses (xrd) to sales 
(sale). 
NO_INTENSITY An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has no intangible assets, 
namely Int_intensity=0, and zero otherwise. 
CAP_INTENSITY Capital asset intensity measured by the ratio of PPE (ppent) to asset 
(at). 
SIZE The natural log of total assets (Compustat item at) at the beginning of 
year t. 
BM The ratio of book value of equity (ceq) to market value of equity 
(prcc_f *csho). 
ZSCORE Altman’s (1980) Z-score measured by the following formula: 
0.012*(wcap/at)+0.014*(re/at)+0.033(ebit/at)+0.06*(prcc_f*csho)/(dltt
+dlc)+0.999(sale/at). 
WRITE-OFF An indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports a writedown 
(wdp) in the year, and zero otherwise. 
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Variables  Definitions  
Panel A: Accruals Analysis  
  
AUDITOR An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s auditor (au) is one of 
the largest six audit firms. 
STD_CFO The standard deviation of cash flow from operations (oancf) divided by 
total assets, where the standard deviation is calculated by using the 
prior five fiscal years and requiring a minimum of three years of data. 
STD_SALE The standard deviation of sales (sale) divided by total assets (at), where 
the standard deviation is calculated by using the prior five fiscal years 
and requiring a minimum of three years of data. 
M&A An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is involved in a merger or 
acquisition in the prior three years, and zero otherwise. 
  
Panel B: ICW Analysis 
ICW An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has an ICW reported in 
Audit Analytics during the fiscal year and zero otherwise. 
POST An indicator variable that equals one if a firm-year’s fiscal end falls 
between Jan 1, 2010 and Dec 31, 2014, and zero otherwise. 
MARKETCAP The log of the product of number of shares outstanding (Compustat 
item csho) and share price (prcc_f). 
FIRM AGE The number of years the firm has CRSP pricing data. 
AGGREGATE 
LOSS 
An indicator variable that equals one if the sum of earnings before 
extraordinary items (ib) in year t and t-1 is less than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
SEGMENTS The sum of the number of operating (Compustat Segment item opseg) 
and geographic (geoseg) segments. 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
An indicator variable that equals one if the foreign exchange 
income/loss (fca) is non-zero in year t, and zero otherwise. 
ACQUISITION 
VALUE 
The sum of acquisition (aqc) in year t and t-1 scaled by the acquiring 
firm’s market capitalization. 
EXTREME SALES 
GROWTH 
An indicator variable that equals one if industry-adjusted sales growth 
from year t-1 to t falls into the top quantile, and zero otherwise. 
RESTRUCTURE An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is involved in a 
restructuring in year t, and zero otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Sample Selection Criteria Sample Size in Firm-Years 
 
 Accruals 
Analysis-
U.S 
Accruals 
Analysis-
Canada 
Section 
404 ICW 
Analysis 
Section 
302 ICW 
Analysis 
 
All firm-years on Annual Compustat 
(North America) with data between Jan 
1st, 2006 and Dec 31st, 2015 
 
 
86,171 86,171 86,171 86,171 
 
Excluding foreign firms and firms in the 
financial industrya 
 
32,458 
 
32,458 32,458 
 
Excluding U.S. firms, Canadian firms 
cross-listed in the U.S., and firms in the 
financial industryb 
 
 6,802   
 
Excluding firms with missing data for the 
regression variables, with total assets less 
than or equal to zero, firms belonging to a 
two-digit industry SIC group with fewer 
than 20 observations, and/or firms outside 
of the sample period 2006 to 2014 
 
10,138 1,488 
  
 
Excluding firms with missing Section 302 
ICW data from Audit Analytics and/or 
missing data for the regression variables 
 
 
  
19,611 
 
 
Excluding firms with missing Section 404 
ICW data from Audit Analytics and/or 
missing data for the regression variables 
 
 
  
 
 
21,260 
 
a
 We eliminate all financial sector firms from our sample by excluding all firms with SIC codes in the 6000-6999 
range. To focus our analysis on US firms, we select firms where the FIC code equals “USA” and where the Stock 
Exchange Code (EXCHG) equals 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 or 18. 
b
 To identify Canadian firms, we combine firms’ CUSIP in Canadian Financial Market Research Centre with firms’ 
CUSIP in Compustat, and require that the FIC code equals “CAN” and the EXCHG equals 7, 8, 9, or 19. 
 
 39 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: US Firms 
 
Variable 
 
N 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
ABS_DA 10,138 0.014 0.051 0.032 0.064 0.059 
POST 10,138 0 0.532 1 1 0.499 
RESTRUCTURE 10,138 0 0.495 0 1 0.500 
GROWTH 10,138 0.013 0.124 0.077 0.171 0.223 
%LOSS 10,138 0 0.276 0.2 0.4 0.341 
INVENTORY 10,138 0.011 0.116 0.078 0.177 0.128 
INT_INTENSITY 10,138 0 0.163 0.018 0.072 0.725 
NO_INTENSITY 10,138 0 0.295 0 1 0.456 
CAP_INTENSITY 10,138 0.091 0.266 0.184 0.385 0.229 
SIZE 10,138 5.148 6.714 6.761 8.260 2.137 
BM 10,138 0.256 0.540 0.461 0.734 0.554 
ZSCORE 10,138 0.606 1.612 0.988 1.541 2.774 
WRITE-OFF 10,138 0 0.177 0 0 0.381 
AUDITOR 10,138 1 0.847 1 1 0.360 
STD_CFO 10,138 0.021 0.054 0.035 0.061 0.060 
STD_SALE 10,138 0.074 0.183 0.134 0.232 0.167 
M&A 10,138 0 0.680 1 1 0.467 
Panel B: Canadian Firms 
ABS_DA 1,488 0.020 0.078 0.049 0.094 0.098 
POST 1,488 0 0.538 1 1 0.499 
RESTRUCTURE 1,488 0 0.217 0 0 0.412 
GROWTH 1,488 0.036 0.456 0.164 0.394 1.115 
%LOSS 1,488 0 0.418 0.4 0.8 0.365 
INVENTORY 1,488 0 0.071 0.020 0.097 0.109 
INT_INTENSITY 1,488 0 0.044 0 0 0.216 
NO_INTENSITY 1,488 1 0.817 1 1 0.387 
CAP_INTENSITY 1,488 0.260 0.546 0.599 0.821 0.304 
SIZE 1,488 4.046 5.424 5.475 6.727 1.807 
BM 1,488 0.398 1.034 0.692 1.201 1.594 
ZSCORE 1,488 0.273 0.979 0.527 1.109 1.515 
WRITE-OFF 1,488 0 0 0 0 0 
AUDITOR 1,488 1 0.910 1 1 0.286 
STD_CFO 1,488 0.028 0.082 0.049 0.086 0.112 
STD_SALE 1,488 0.059 0.176 0.107 0.210 0.227 
M&A 1,488 0 0.549 1 1 0.498 
       
This table reports the number of observations (N), 25th percentile, mean, median, 75th percentile, and 
standard deviation for variables used in the main regressions. See the Appendix, Panel A, for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
 
  
TABLE 3 
The SEC WB Program and Abnormal Accruals  
 
 ABS_DA	   POS_DA	   NEG_DA	   ABS_DA POS_DA NEG_DA 
Intercept 0.070*** 
(0.000)	   0.065*** (0.000)	   -0.075*** (0.000)	   0.070*** (0.000) 0.065*** (0.000) -0.076*** (0.000) 
POST -0.008*** 
(0.000)	   -0.006*** (0.000)	   0.013*** (0.000)	   -0.009*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) 0.014*** (0.000) 
QUI TAM  	    	    	   -0.004 (0.248) 0.002 (0.509) 0.010 (0.118) 
POST*QUI TAM  	    	    	   0.006 (0.175) -0.001 (0.888) -0.015* (0.076) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.031*** 
(0.000)	   0.015*** (0.000)	   -0.042*** (0.000)	   -0.002* (0.096) -0.001 (0.586) 0.003 (0.173) 
GROWTH -0.028*** 
(0.000)	   -0.014** (0.028)	   0.049*** (0.000)	   0.014*** (0.000) 0.011** (0.019) -0.016*** (0.005) 
%LOSS 0.031*** 
(0.000)	   0.015*** (0.000)	   -0.042*** (0.000)	   0.031*** (0.000) 0.015*** (0.000) -0.042*** (0.000) 
INVENTORY -0.028*** 
(0.000)	   -0.014** (0.028)	   0.049*** (0.000)	   -0.028*** (0.000) -0.013** (0.038) 0.050*** (0.000) 
INT_INTENSITY 0.003** 
(0.049)	   0.001 (0.512)	   -0.010*** (0.002)	   0.004** (0.049) 0.001 (0.505) -0.010*** (0.002) 
NO_INTENSITY -0.004** 
(0.013)	   -0.004** (0.028)	   0.004 (0.111)	   -0.004** (0.015) -0.004** (0.022) 0.004 (0.129) 
CAP_INTENSITY -0.022*** 
(0.000)	   -0.026*** (0.000)	   0.018*** (0.003)	   -0.022*** (0.000) -0.026*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.002) 
SIZE -0.003*** 
(0.000)	   -0.002*** (0.000)	   0.004*** (0.000)	   -0.003*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
BM -0.002 
(0.176)	   -0.000 (0.825)	   0.001 (0.478)	   -0.002 (0.171) -0.000 (0.832) 0.002 (0.457) 
ZSCORE -0.001*** 
(0.001)	   -0.000 (0.304)	   0.001*** (0.000)	   -0.001*** (0.001) -0.000 (0.309) 0.001*** (0.000) 
WRITE-OFF 0.012*** 
(0.000)	   0.000 (0.913)	   -0.021*** (0.000)	   0.012*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.928) -0.021*** (0.000) 
AUDITOR -0.006** 
(0.017)	   -0.006** (0.038)	   0.006 (0.158)	   -0.006** (0.017) -0.006** (0.039) 0.006 (0.152) 
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STD_CFO 0.168*** 
(0.000)	   0.193*** (0.000)	   -0.156*** (0.000)	   0.006 (0.270) 0.002 (0.799) -0.009 (0.259) 
STD_SALE 0.006 
(0.279)	   0.002 (0.754)	   -0.009 (0.295)	   0.168*** (0.000) 0.193*** (0.000) -0.155*** (0.000) 
M&A -0.001 
(0.697)	   -0.005*** (0.002)	   -0.004 (0.133)	   -0.001 (0.696) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.142) 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sum of the coefficients 
POST + POST*QUI TAM 
   -0.003 
(0.589) 
-0.007 
(0.110) 
-0.001 
(0.878) 
       
       
Cluster by firm  Yes 	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes  Yes Yes 
F-value (Pr>F) 64.67 
(0.0000)	   34.09 (0.0000)	   39.27 (0.0000)	   57.63 (0.0000) 30.57 (0.0000) 35.23 (0.0000) 
Number 10,138	   5,722	   4,416	   10,138 5,722 4,416 
 
The table presents the Tobit regression results on the effect of Whistleblower Provisions on abnormal accruals. The dependent variable is 
the absolute value of abnormal accruals (ABS_DA) estimated by using the cross-sectional McNichols (2002) model. In column 2, the 
dependent variable is the value of positive abnormal accruals (POS_DA) using the cross-sectional McNichols (2002) model; in column 3, 
the dependent variable is the value of negative abnormal accruals (NEG_DA). The sample includes all available firm-year observations 
from 2006 to 2014 in all columns. P-value based on standard errors clustered by firm is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix, Panel 
A, for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for two-tailed tests. 
TABLE 4 
The SEC WB Program and Abnormal Accruals – US versus Canadian Firms 
 
ABS_DA = α0 + α1POST + α2TREATMENT + α3POST*TREATMENT + α4RESTRUCTURE + 
α5GROWTH + α6%LOSS + α7INVENTORY + α8INT_INTENSITY +α9NO_INT + 
α10CAP_INTENSITY + α11SIZE + α12BM + α13ZSCORE + α14WRITE-OFF + α15AUDITOR + 
α16STD_CFO + α17STD_SALE + α18M&A + ∑INDUSTRY + ε	  
 ABS_DA POS_DA NEG_DA 
Intercept 0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
-0.080*** 
(0.000) 
POST 0.002 
(0.596) 
-0.004 
(0.474) 
-0.010 
(0.179) 
TREATMENT -0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.274) 
POST*TREATMENT -0.011** 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.692) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
RESTRUCTURE -0.003** 
(0.048) 
-0.002 
(0.311) 
0.003 
(0.140) 
GROWTH 0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.010** 
(0.012) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
%LOSS 0.030*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.043*** 
(0.000) 
INVENTORY -0.026*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013* 
(0.054) 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
INT_INTENSITY 0.003* 
(0.084) 
0.001 
(0.664) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
NO_INTENSITY -0.004*** 
(0.010) 
-0.004** 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.136) 
CAP_INTENSITY -0.020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.016** 
(0.011) 
SIZE -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
BM -0.002* 
(0.084) 
-0.001 
(0.273) 
0.002 
(0.262) 
ZSCORE -0.001*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.279) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
WRITE-OFF 0.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.846) 
-0.021*** 
(0.000) 
AUDITOR -0.005* 
(0.063) 
-0.007** 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.363) 
STD_CFO 0.190*** 
(0.000) 
0.230*** 
(0.000) 
-0.158*** 
(0.000) 
STD_SALE 0.006 
(0.300) 
0.002 
(0.847) 
-0.010 
(0.276) 
M&A -0.000 
(0.776) 
-0.004** 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.250) 
    
Cluster by firm  Yes  Yes Yes 
F-value (Pr>F) 62.11 
(0.0000) 
30.19 
(0.0000) 
38.20 
(0.0000) 
Number 11,626 6,530 5,096 
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The table presents the Tobit regression results on the effect of Whistleblower 
Provisions on abnormal accruals. The dependent variable is the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals (ABS_DA) estimated by using the cross-sectional McNichols 
(2002) model. In column 2, the dependent variable is the value of positive abnormal 
accruals (POS_DA) using the cross-sectional McNichols (2002) model; in column 3, 
the dependent variable is the value of negative abnormal accruals (NEG_DA). The 
sample includes all available firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014 in all 
columns. P-value based on standard errors clustered by firm is displayed in 
parentheses. See the Appendix, Panel A, for variable definitions. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for two-tailed tests. 
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TABLE 5 
The SEC WB Program and Abnormal Accruals  
– Impact of Firm Internal Compliance Program Strength 
 
 
ABS_DA = α0 + α1POST + α2WB_TOT + α3POST*WB_TOT + α4RESTRUCTURE + 
α5GROWTH + α6%LOSS + α7INVENTORY + α8INT_INTENSITY +α9NO_INT + 
α10CAP_INTENSITY + α11SIZE + α12BM + α13ZSCORE + α14WRITE-OFF + 
α15AUDITOR + α16STD_CFO + α17STD_SALE + α18M&A + ∑INDUSTRY + ε	  
                                       ABS_DA	  
Intercept 0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.004) 
0.032** 
(0.018) 
0.044*** 
(0.001) 
POST	   0.005 
(0.342)	   -0.005 (0.176)	   0.002 (0.734)	   0.008 (0.226)	   -0.005 (0.127)	  
WB_TOT 0.001 
(0.124) 
    
POST* WB_TOT -0.002** 
(0.014) 
    
WB_PE  0.002 
(0.507) 
   
POST*WB_PE  -0.002 
(0.544) 
   
WB_IR   0.001 
(0.377) 
  
POST*WB_IR   -0.003** 
(0.046) 
  
WB_PROT    0.002* 
(0.086) 
 
POST* WB_PROT    -0.004** 
(0.019) 
 
LOBBY     -0.002 
(0.565) 
POST*LOBBY     -0.004 
(0.452) 
RESTRUCTURE -0.001 
(0.861) 
-0.000 
(0.902) 
-0.001 
(0.775) 
-0.000 
(0.903) 
-0.000 
(0.920) 
GROWTH 0.024** 
(0.022) 
0.024** 
(0.019) 
0.023** 
(0.029) 
0.024** 
(0.020) 
0.023** 
(0.028) 
%LOSS 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
INVENTORY -0.006 
(0.728) 
-0.006 
(0.722) 
-0.006 
(0.738) 
-0.006 
(0.734) 
-0.008 
(0.621) 
INT_INTENSITY 0.006 
(0.795) 
0.007 
(0.769) 
0.006 
(0.781) 
0.006 
(0.780) 
0.006 
(0.777) 
NO_INTENSITY -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.000) 
CAP_INTENSITY -0.012 
(0.110) 
-0.012 
(0.114) 
-0.012 
(0.106) 
-0.011 
(0.116) 
-0.012 
(0.114) 
SIZE -0.001 
(0.153) 
-0.001 
(0.142) 
-0.001 
(0.132) 
-0.001 
(0.159) 
-0.001 
(0.116) 
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BM 0.002 
(0.579) 
0.002 
(0.579) 
0.002 
(0.551) 
0.002 
(0.628) 
0.003 
(0.490) 
ZSCORE -0.001 
(0.499) 
-0.000 
(0.565) 
-0.000 
(0.531) 
-0.001 
(0.509) 
-0.000 
(0.572) 
WRITEOFF 0.004 
(0.172) 
0.004 
(0.166) 
0.004 
(0.177) 
0.004 
(0.167) 
0.004 
(0.217) 
AUDITOR 0.001 
(0.933) 
0.001 
(0.900) 
0.001 
(0.928) 
0.001 
(0.938) 
0.000 
(0.967) 
STD_CFO 0.002 
(0.885) 
0.002 
(0.920) 
0.001 
(0.937) 
0.002 
(0.906) 
0.001 
(0.928) 
STD_SALE 0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.236*** 
(0.000) 
0.237*** 
(0.000) 
0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.239*** 
(0.000) 
M&A 0.003 
(0.419) 
0.002 
(0.514) 
0.003 
(0.402) 
0.002 
(0.487) 
0.002 
(0.441) 
Intercept 0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.004) 
0.032** 
(0.018) 
0.044*** 
(0.001) 
 
Cluster by firm  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
F-value (Pr>F) 12.19 
(0.0000) 
12.38 
(0.0000) 
12.04 
(0.0000) 
12.23 
(0.0000) 
12.27 
(0.0000) 
Number  1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 1,502 
      
 
The table shows the Tobit regression results on the impact of weak internal reporting 
on the negative relation between Whistleblower Provisions and absolute abnormal 
accruals. Following BMW (2017), we use four proxies for weak internal reporting: 
WB_PE (i.e., the score of program efficacy), WB_IR (i.e., the score of independence 
of reporting), WB_PROT (i.e., the score of the protection of Whistleblowers), and 
WB_TOT (i.e., the sum of the three scores). The sample includes all available firm-
year observations from 2006 to 2014 in all columns. P-value based on standard errors 
clustered by firm is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix, Panel A, for variable 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for two-
tailed tests. 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics – Section 404 and 302 Internal Control Weakness 
Analysis 
 
Panel A: Section 404 
 
Variable 
 
N 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
ICW 19,611 0 0.061 0 0 0.240 
POST 19,611 0 0.558 1 1 0.497 
MARKETCAP 19,611 5.132 6.467 6.445 7.787 1.959 
FIRM AGE 19,611 7.578 19.815 14.816 25.734 17.603 
AGGREGATE 
LOSS 
19,611 0 0.310 0 1 0.462 
SEGMENTS 19,611 1 3.247 2 5 3.398 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
19,611 0 0.323 0 1 0.468 
ACQUISITION 
VALUE 
19,611 0 0.065 0.001 0.055 0.153 
EXTREME SALES 
GROWTH 
19,611 0 0.264 0 1 0.441 
RESTRUCTURE 19,611 0 0.313 0 1 0.464 
 
Panel B: Section 302 
 
Variable 
 
N 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
ICW 21,260 0 0.091 0 0 0.288 
POST 21,260 0 0.556 1 1 0.497 
MARKETCAP 21,260 5.451 6.730 6.641 7.926 1.808 
FIRM AGE 21,260 7.603 20.214 15.118 26.630 17.887 
AGGREGATE 
LOSS 
21,260 0 0.290 0 1 0.454 
SEGMENTS 21,260 1 3.297 2 5 3.348 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
21,260 0 0.324 0 1 0.468 
ACQUISITION 
VALUE 
21,260 0 0.065 0.002 0.056 0.151 
EXTREME SALES 
GROWTH 
21,260 0 0.258 0 1 0.438 
RESTRUCTURE 21,260 0 0.338 0 1 0.473 
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This table reports the number of observations (N), 25th percentile, mean, median, 75th 
percentile, and standard deviation for variables used in the main regressions. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. See the Appendix, Panel B, for 
variable definitions.  
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TABLE 7 
The SEC WB Program and Section 404 and 302 Internal Controls Weaknesses  
 
Probit (ICW)= β0 + β1POST + β2MARKETCAP + β3FIRM AGE + β4AGGREGATE LOSS  
+ β5SEGMENTS + Β6FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS + β7ACQUISITION VALUE  
+ β8EXTREME SALES GROWTH + β9RESTRUCTURE + ε 
	  
 Probit (ICW) 
 
	   Section 404 Section 302 
Intercept -0.698*** 
(0.000) 
-0.355*** 
(0.000) 
POST -0.093*** 
(0.002) 
-0.231*** 
(0.000) 
MARKETCAP -0.140*** 
(0.000) 
-0.152*** 
(0.000) 
FIRM AGE -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
AGGREGATE LOSS 0.085*** 
(0.009) 
0.183*** 
(0.000) 
SEGMENTS 0.009* 
(0.056) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
0.046 
(0.167) 
0.127*** 
(0.000) 
ACQUISITION VALUE 0.055 
(0.527) 
-0.058 
(0.457) 
EXTREME SALES 
GROWTH 
0.139*** 
(0.000) 
0.097*** 
(0.001) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.050 
(0.140) 
0.043 
(0.131) 
 	   	  
Pseudo R-squared 0.0498 0.0636 
Number 19,611 21,260 
 
This table presents the Probit regression results on the effect of the SEC 
Whistleblower Provisions on internal control. The dependent variable in column 1 (2), 
ICW, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has an internal control weakness 
reported in Audit Analytics Section 404 (Section 302) during the fiscal year (any 
quarter during the fiscal year) and zero otherwise. The sample includes all available 
firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014 in all columns. P-value based on standard 
errors clustered by firm is displayed in parentheses. See the Appendix, Panel B for 
variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, for two-tailed tests. 
 
  
TABLE 8 
Ineffective Control Disclosures Under Section 302  - Internal Compliance Programs 
 
 
            
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average  
PRE 
2006-2009 
Average  
POST 
2010-2014 
 
Panel A - Code 82 – Inadequate or not-implemented internal whistleblower policy (including a hotline) 
 
Frequency 0.61% 0.76% 0.65% 0.52% 0.51% 0.33% 0.30% 0.25% 0.33% 0.64% 0.34% 
Number 44 53 43 33 32 21 19 16 21 43.3 21.8 
 
Panel B - Code 84 – Problem involving the formulation or implementation of an effective Code of Ethics 
 
Frequency 0.80% 1.28% 1.10% 0.96% 0.98% 0.70% 0.59% 0.40% 0.56% 1.04% 0.65% 
Number 57 89 72 61 62 44 37 25 35 69.8 40.6 
 
Panel C - Code 67 – Weakness relating to the senior management tone (“tone at the top”) 
 
Frequency 1.70% 1.89% 1.58% 1.04% 0.82% 0.40% 0.32% 0.32% 0.19% 1.55% 0.41% 
Number 122 132 104 66 52 25 20 20 12 106.0 25.8 
 
The table reports the frequency of weaknesses relating to a firm’s internal whistleblower policy and / or Code of Ethics. 
A firm is included in the count if the code appears in any of four quarters in the fiscal year. 
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TABLE 9 
The SEC WB Program and ICWs relating to a Firm’s Internal Compliance Program 
 
Logit (Code) = β0 + β1POST + β2MARKETCAP + β3FIRM AGE + β4AGGREGATE LOSS + β5SEGMENTS + β6FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS  
                                                 + β7ACQUISITION VALUE + β8EXTREME SALES GROWTH + β9RESTRUCTURE + ε 
                                                            
Logit (Ineffective IC) 	  
           Code 82 (Internal WB 
Policy) 
Code 82 (Internal WB 
Policy) and/or 84 
(Code of Ethics) 
Code 82 (Internal WB Policy) 
and/or 84 (Code of Ethics) 
and/or 67 (Tone at the Top) 
 
Intercept -5.575*** 
(0.000) 
-4.536*** 
(0.000) 
-3.490*** 
(0.000) 
POST -0.679*** 
(0.006) 
-0.373** 
(0.036) 
-0.978*** 
(0.000) 
MARKETCAP -0.124 
(0.133) 
-0.138** 
(0.023) 
-0.154*** 
(0.001) 
FIRM AGE 0.007 
(0.356) 
-0.003 
(0.626) 
-0.007 
(0.162) 
AGGREGATE LOSS 1.138*** 
(0.000) 
0.712*** 
(0.000) 
0.498*** 
(0.001) 
SEGMENTS 0.055* 
(0.085) 
0.053** 
(0.029) 
0.055*** 
(0.004) 
FOREIGN 
TRANSACTIONS 
0.978*** 
(0.000) 
0.625*** 
(0.001) 
0.454*** 
(0.002) 
ACQUISITION VALUE 1.027* 
(0.061) 
0.574 
(0.216) 
0.480 
(0.174) 
EXTREME SALES 
GROWTH 
-0.231 
(0.430) 
-0.082 
(0.695) 
-0.148 
(0.368) 
RESTRUCTURE -0.759*** 
(0.007) 
-0.398* 
(0.051) 
-0.185 
(0.228) 	   	   	   	  
Wald Chi-squared 63.97 57.72 113.70 
Number 21,260 21,260 21,260 
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This table presents the Logit regression results of the effect of the SEC Whistleblower Provisions on internal control weaknesses related to a 
firm’s internal compliance program using Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation. The dependent variable in column 1 is a weakness is 
the firm’s internal WB Policy (Code 82) and is equal to one if the code appears in any of four quarters in the fiscal year, or zero otherwise. 
The dependent variable in column 2 is a weakness is the firm’s internal WB Policy (Code 82) and/or Code of Ethics (Code 84) and is equal 
to one if the code appears in either category in any of four quarters in the fiscal year, or zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column 3 
is a weakness is the firm’s internal WB Policy (Code 82) and/or Code of Ethics (Code 84) and/or Tone at the Top (Code 67) and is equal to 
one if the code appears in either of the three categories in any of four quarters in the fiscal year, or zero otherwise. The sample includes all 
available firm-year observations from 2006 to 2014 in all columns. P-value based on standard errors clustered by firm is displayed in 
parentheses. See the Appendix, Panel B for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, for two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
